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Aristotelian Concept of 
Happiness (Eudaimonia) and 
its Conative Role in Human 
Existence: A Critical Evaluation
Abstract
Despite the challenges of human existence, identifying the major features that sustain 
man’s striving to persist in life (conatus) is very essential in understanding who man is. This 
paper critically evaluates Aristotelian concept of happiness (eudaimonia) and its conative 
role in human existence as it ignites newness of interest in Aristotelian theory of happiness 
as the ultimate end of all human activities. Aristotle’s notion of happiness connotes 
conative experiences; actions that signify movements of some sorts for preservation of 
life. With regard to self-preservation in existence, Aristotle held the opinion that man has 
the natural inclination to actualize his potentialities through strong efforts of the will 
towards the right, and at the same time to create new potentialities to sustain his life. 
Through the activities of the soul (virtuous acts), man propels himself in a distinctive way 
towards objects of his desire for survival and flourishing. His concept of emotions as having 
the affective, cognitive as well as behavioural dimensions revealed that emotions have 
psychological values and vital functions which serve as survival instinct in man. However, 
they differ in their aims in that they have both attractive and aversive characteristics such 
that they move him either to seek or to avoid necessary objects that enhance or harm his 
existence, respectively. Considering the subjective experiences of pains and pleasures of 
emotions, they dispose man to virtuous actions towards excellence. However, to sustain 
man’s inner drive to persist in life, this paper objects to the theses that happiness can be 
restricted to only cognitive activities. Despite the weaknesses of his treatise concerning 
happiness in relation to man’s striving to persist, it was observed that Aristotle’s notion 
of happiness aids man’s striving in life. For further studies, it recommended clarification of 
ambiguous concepts and reconciliation of contradictions inherent in the theory.
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I. Introduction
Aristotle has surely earned a very credible status in philosophical endeavour through his systematic articulations. He tried to respond to what constitutes the ultimate aim of man’s existence; the end for 
which every other action tends motivated him to develop a classical treatise 
on happiness (eudaimonia). He holds that man’s supreme purpose of life is to 
attain the ultimate perfection of his human nature. In his understanding, the 
pursuit of happiness presupposes an inner drive of continuous striving towards 
good moral character. Hence, the essence of human existence is not simply 
to live but to live well and attain perfection. Issues regarding the notion of 
Aristotelian happiness and its conative role in existence as well as the activity 
of the soul, the roles of desire, and emotions with regard to attainment of 
happiness will be critically discussed below. 
II. Aristotelian concept of happiness as conatus
Aristotle’s notion of happiness is chiefly presented in his monumental 
Nicomachean Ethics (NE) particularly in book I. At the very beginning of 
the book, he asserts that every rational activity, that is every activity of 
man, aims at some end or good and that even one end may be subordinated 
to another end as instrumental string to achieving other goals until the 
ultimate end is arrived at. So, he states, “every art and every investigation, 
and similarly every action and pursuit is considered to aim at some good. 
Hence, the Good has been rightly defined as ‘that at which all things aim.’”1 
In his understanding, all intermediate goals, also referred to as instrumental 
goals, must purposefully aim at final goal which is desired for its own sake. 
Otherwise, it would entailed an infinite progression of activities. Therefore, 
he identified the final goal of all human activities as happiness (eudaimonia). 
According to him, “Everything that we choose, we choose for the sake of 
something else – except happiness which is an end.”2 Actually, Aristotelian 
happiness denotes a good life. Lawhead considers it to be ‘well-being’ or 
‘having a life worthliving.’3 Kesebir and Diener conceived it as subjective 
well-being and feeling of satisfaction.4 The course of attainment of happiness 
is a lifetime endeavour that encapsulates man’s entire life and leads him to 
1 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K Thomson (New York: Allen and Unwin, 
1976), 1094a1-22.
2 Ibid., 1176a30-b15.
3 William Lawhead, The Voyage of Discovery: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy, 2nd ed. 
(Belmont: Wadsworth-Thomson Learning, 2002), 81.
4 Pelin Kesebir, and Ed Diener, “In Pursuit of Happiness: Empirical Answers to Philosophical 
Questions,” Journal of Happiness Studies 3, no. 2 (2008): 117-125.
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perfection and enhancement of his life. It requires as well strong efforts of 
the will towards the right path of goal-oriented activities of the soul, desire, 
and emotions. The principle of acquiring happiness is strongly opposed to 
instant gratification and pleasures of the moment. Aristotle establishes that 
the attainment of happiness is enshrined in man’s natural desire which is 
implicated in his innate drive (conatus) to persist in life.
The study of conatus in regard to man’s ‘will to live’ has gained newness 
of interest in various disciplines, including philosophy. Conatus, generally, 
concerns itself with the fundamental law of nature which has to do with 
self-preservation and maintenance of life. It connotes the ‘will to persist’ 
which basically implies an innate striving towards self-preservation through 
necessary activities that sustain life and prevent it from being harmed or 
even being lost. Simply put, it refers to “an innate inclination of a thing to 
continue to exist and enhance itself.”5 It also explains the “instinctive ‘will 
to live’ of living organisms or to various metaphysical theories of motion 
and inertia.”6 Keeping oneself from harm and destruction is often considered 
as the root cause of all human activities and the will to persist in life.
Although the term conatus was widely believed7 to have been used 
first by the Stoics, with the meaning of the movement of the soul towards 
an object from which physical actions result, Aristotle’s writings especially 
on happiness, human soul, emotions and rhetoric can be connected to it. 
Despite the ambiguity of Aristotle’s treatise on those themes, it can be 
still observed that they portray the unfolding of human nature towards 
self-preservation. It has been established earlier that Aristotle’s position 
on the ultimate purpose of life is happiness. According to him, happiness is 
that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something 
else. The drive to attain happiness is therefore the focal point of all human 
endeavours and an ultimate goal in itself. He further clarified that it 
is something on itself that is completely satisfying. “We always choose 
it for itself and never for any other reason. It is different with honour, 
pleasure, intelligence and good qualities.”8 Knowing fully well that views 
on happiness differ and that different people associate it with pleasures, he 
quickly distinguishes happiness from mere pleasure. Thus, 
5 John Traupman, The Bantam New College Latin and English Dictionary (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1996), 52.
6 Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1934), vol. 2, 202.
7 Vasiliki Grigoropoulou, “In History of Philosophy,” Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress 
of Philosophy, vol. 14 (2018): 55-76.
8 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1097a15-b2.
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happiness does not lie in amusement; it would indeed be strange 
if the end were amusement, and one were to take trouble and 
suffer hardship all one’s life in order to amuse oneself.9 
However, he recognizes that minimal degree of pleasure promotes good life. 
Lawhead captures it well when he wrote, 
lack of resources as friends, health and sufficient material support 
take the lustre from happiness. While pleasure is not the goal of 
human life, it accompanies the life that is morally excellent.10 
Aristotle meant that man’s ultimate end is happiness which is conditioned 
by his very nature that essentially characterizes him to strive to maintain his 
existence. This feature distinguishes him from animals and inanimate objects. 
Again, this purposeful end of human activities presupposes reason and acts of 
excellence (virtues).
III. Happiness and its conative role in human existence
Aristotle considers happiness not as a passive state but as an active state 
of life that by itself is self-sufficient and makes life desirable.11 He adjudges 
it therefore to a virtuous activity of the soul that presupposes reason. In 
particular, his explication of happiness presents a teleological image of 
human nature with purposeful character whereby the essence of man harbours 
specific inner drive to behave and develop in a peculiar way towards full 
actualization. The actualization of man’s potentialities and the creation 
of new potentialities are seen as conative features of man’s persistence in 
existence. As man comes into existence, he possesses the natural drive to 
undergo development. According to Aristotle, happiness is attained when a 
man lives in accordance to his nature; the inclination to continue to develop 
through actualization of his potentials. On this note, Lawhead remarks 
that “nature is a busy drama of restless, changing entities.”12 Against this 
background, motion is a good character of conatus since the later involves 
a life force in living things. In Aristotle’s understanding, the conative role of 
happiness in human life can further be seen as an activity of the soul.
9 Ibid., 1176a30-b15.
10 Lawhead, 81.
11 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1097a15-b2.
12 Lawhead, 79.
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IV. The activity of the soul in conative role of happiness in human existence
Considering the nature of happiness, Aristotle holds that it can be acquired 
by moral goodness other than by chance. According to him, happiness is a 
virtuous activity of the soul which guides man’s actions and drives him towards 
excellence. His virtue ethics concerns itself chiefly with life of flourishing 
and excellence which at the time points to conatus, the will to persist. 
Hence, virtue has the character of self-preservation through right desire with 
the right reason and good choice of action. Arguing that moral principles 
produce human excellence and judgment of right principles to follow, the 
appropriation of feelings and appetites lead towards its realization, he 
maintains that virtue involves proper choices and desires. Aristotelian notion 
of desire explains the movement of the soul towards an object that results 
to a physical act. This movement also involves aversion of the soul from 
an object of destruction. Desire also connotes appetite. Appetite itself can 
be said to be synonymous with conatus. Hence, Aristotle connects appetite 
to conative activity. In conative context, human desire (appetite) is put in 
motion by man’s natural inclination to conserve himself, to endure and to 
continue to exist. It seems deeply characteristic of man to propel himself in 
a distinctive way towards objects of his desire for survival and flourishing.13 
In this way, man is said to engage in goal-oriented behaviours to achieve 
his conscious and unconscious goals. In his principal psychological treatise 
On the Soul (De anima), he explained that the soul is the “first actuality of a 
natural organic body”14 that has life potentially. As the actuality of a body 
has a life force, it is causally responsible for the animate behaviour (the life 
activities) of a living thing; the capacity of a living thing to engage in the 
activities that are characteristic of its natural kind15 such as self-nourishment, 
growth, movement, perception, thought, etc. Therefore, the soul has the 
capacity for growth and reproduction for self-preservation. 
The soul in living creatures is distinguished by two functions, 
the judging capacity which is a function of the intellect and of 
sensation combined and the capacity for exciting movement in 
space.16 
13 Jeff Malpas, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta (Stanford: Scholarly 
Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition, Winter 2012), 24.
14 Aristotle, De anima, trans. Polansky Ronald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
II, 1, 412b5-6.
15 Ibid., II, 1, 412b5-6. 
16 Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. W. S. Hett (London: William Heinemann, 1964), 181.
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Although the soul is implicated in motion in pursuit of its objects of desire, 
it is not sufficient to initiate motion but it depends on the appetite (desire) 
whose major duty is to initiate movement towards the desired end.17 In 
this way, he considered desire a faculty in the soul to initiate motion for 
purposive actions, though not completely.18 Therefore, he included the 
faculty of practical reason as a source of movement in working together 
with the faculty of desire when the object of desire is desirable.19 This is the 
conative role of happiness as man’s desire as implicated in the activity of 
the soul towards objects of actions that sustain his persistence to maintain 
his existence. Aristotle’s notion of desire as the activity of the soul also is 
connected to human emotions.
V. Emotions in conative role of happiness in human existence
The concept of emotion is a complex phenomenon that encompasses cognitive, 
desiderative and affective aspects of human nature. Understood as capable 
of arousing distinctive bodily changes, movements and behaviors, emotions 
are generally considered as survival mechanisms that motivate responsive 
behaviors to maintain existence. Based on their chains of action, they have five 
major components of evaluative (appraisal of the object), physiological (the 
state of the body), phenomenological (subjective experiences of pleasant or 
unpleasant feelings), expressive (distinctive bodily changes) and behavioural 
(fleeing or combating tendency). To this effect, emotion theorists have been 
categorized into three major classes of affective, evaluative and motivational 
traditions.20 With Aristotle, human emotions play very vital roles in man’s 
life, including the striving to survive life and maintain himself in existence. 
As many classical Greek philosophers, Aristotle considers emotions as 
affective experiences, though co-existing with cognitive aspects of man.21 As 
such, he identified both physical and mental states of man in his explications 
of emotions, though with little emphasis on bodily sensations. For him, 
emotions are built on beliefs and assessments that give meaning and value 
to situations of life. Consequently, man’s judgments of life’s situations are 
greatly influenced by his emotions. Specifically, he adjudges emotions to be 
parts of the soul (sensual aspects of the soul as they belong to lower part of 
17 Aristotle, De anima, III, 432b14-33a5.
18 Ibid., 10, 433a31-433b1.
19 Ibid., III, 10, 433a17-2.
20 Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 559-567.
21 Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle’s Concept of Mind,” Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 72, no. 
1 (1971-2): 101-114.
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the soul) because they are subject to and moderated by reason and they are 
involved in the pursuit of happiness for man seeks for happiness with his whole 
soul. His treatise on emotions which he refers to as pathos in the second 
book of his Rhetoric stands as one of the three major methods of rhetoric 
arts namely; ethos, pathos and logos and it aims at “relating emotional 
susceptibilities of an audience to the art of persuasion.”22 Such use of rhetoric 
arts helps to manage people’s emotions in other to produce the desired 
beliefs in them. Emotions have psychological values and vital functions. 
Taking critical stance, some authors argue that pathos has more to do with 
affection than with emotion, though it closely connects to the later.23 In 
Aristotelian understanding, emotions connote conative experiences; actions 
that signify movements of some sorts for preservation of life. According to 
him, emotions regulate man’s life. They differ in their aims in that they have 
both attractive and aversive characteristics such that they move him either 
to seek or to avoid necessary objects that enhance or harm his existence, 
respectively. They are related to desires and accompanied by feelings of 
pleasure or pain.24 The characteristics of emotions as pain and pleasure map 
man’s value of life. To have an emotion is to have the experiences of pleasure, 
pain or both which is goal-oriented. The experience of being pained or being 
pleasured disposes man to ill- or well- regulated passions. In his words, 
we have special class of ‘somatic passions’ to which the pains of 
want and the pleasures of replenishment are referred and which 
may reasonably be supposed to include appetites of hunger, 
thirst and sex.25 
Taking into account the subjective experiences of pains and pleasures of 
emotions as dispositions to virtues towards excellent actions, he states, “the 
pleasure or pain that actions cause the agent may serve as an index of moral 
progress since good conduct consists of proper attitude towards pleasure and 
pain.”26 Considering emotions as states of pleasure and pain, he also refers 
to it as passions which he primarily regarded as states that affect judgement. 
And defining passions, he enumerated species of pleasures and pains.
 
22 H. N. Gardiner, “The Psychology of the Affections in Plato and Aristotle,” The Psychological 
Review 28, no. 1 (1919): 1-26.
23 Asli Yazici, “Aristotle’s Theory of Emotion,” Turkish Studies 10, no. 6 (2015): 901-922.
24 Aristotle, De anima; Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle’s Concept of Mind,” Proceedings of 
Aristotelian Society 72, no. 1 (1971-2): 101-114.
25 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104b20-1105a9.
26 Ibid., 1104a33-b20.
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By passions, I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, 
joy, love, hate, longing, emulation, pity, and in general states 
accompanied by pleasure and pain.27 
Aristotle’s concept of passion has conative characteristics in the sense that 
it expresses appetites, tendencies and striving to persist in life although with 
obvious ambiguities. To this end, one actually wonders whether he has it 
in mind to specifically discuss conatus (the will to persist) in relation to 
happiness. Therefore, his terms and their explications on the issues should be 
sharpened to minimize such uncertainties. 
VI. A critical evaluation of Aristotelian concept of happiness and its 
conative role in human existence
As said earlier, Aristotle considers happiness as the meaning and ultimate end 
of man’s life; the whole aim and end of human existence that encapsulate man’s 
entire life. In pioneering the course of man’s happiness, he maintained a credible 
position in philosophical world and in other fields of life, Aristotle maintained 
a credible position in philosophical world and in other fields of life. Despite his 
wonderful contributions on the concept of happiness and its conative role in 
human existence, there are some basic issues inherent in his treatise that elicit 
critiques. 
First of all, one of the most salient problems that this paper tries to address 
is the multiplicity of notions related to the pursuit of happiness; an inner drive 
towards ‘good moral character.’A question could be: does it mean that those 
without good moral character (unfortunately, anyway) do not possess an inner 
drive to persist in life? Again, as Hosseini, Zaraeie and Karami hinted, Aristotle 
paid too much attention to human reason, while less to the nature of man. His 
restriction of happiness to cognitive activity stresses that the function of man is 
to reason.28 Thus, 
the function of man is to live a certain kind of life and this activity 
implies a rational principle and the function of a good man is the good 
and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed in 
accord with the appropriate excellence. If this is the case, then happiness 
turns out to be an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.29 
27 Ibid., 1105b2-26.
28 Hassan Hoseini, Tayebe Zareie, and Mohsen Karami, “Evaluation of Happiness Concept in 
the Aristotle Viewpoint,” Journal of Applied Environmental and Biological Sciences 6, no. 3 
(2016): 104-111.
29 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b22-1098a8.
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Then, with regard to the inner drive to persist, one questions the fate of those 
with cognitive impairment or even those with temporal lack of mental capacity 
either due to genetic conditions or sicknesses, old age, etc. It is either that he 
considers them less human for lack of such mental ability or that he adjudges 
them incapable of attaining the happiness that he propounds. Yet, such people 
in many cases, especially the sick ones, survive and thrive due to persistent hope 
and faith in play other than reason. In some human existential conditions, faith 
prevails reason, especially where science fails, miracle then triumphs.
Furthermore, in his view, the attainment of happiness is teleological in 
which case he gives the impression that happiness, which is an end and a goal 
in itself, may not be attainable as it transcends this physical world. Apart from 
one imagining that Aristotelian concept and course of happiness renders life so 
strict and makes man only a thinking entity with austere existence, it exposes 
the danger of the teleological nature of his happiness which demands a good 
modicum of constant discipline. This lies in the fact that one might easily loose 
the elasticity of conative character (inner drive) in continuing to pursue what 
one cannot enjoy as one presently lives in this physical world. It can happen 
that at a certain point in life, one may be overwhelmed and as such develop 
akrasia (weakness of the will). Hence, the intermediary ends (goals) should 
have been considered as significantly important as they can serve to sustain the 
innate drive. That would mean the act of stopping intermittently to enjoy the 
fount of life and gather energy to forge ahead. 
Moreover, the virtuous acts which man reiterates as excellent channels to 
attainment of happiness harbour some controversies. In the first place, virtuous 
acts have no universal character and standard of evaluation since they differ 
across individuals, cultures, epochs and in various circumstances. Therefore, there 
is no guiding principle to control them. This implicates the existence of moral 
relativism in the pursuit of the said happiness.30 
Again, Ezedike’s observation of the claim that, “right actions must be 
understood by reference to virtue”31 points to another weakness of the theory. 
This explains that “an action is right if and only if it conforms to virtue.”32 
In his critique, it should have been the other way instead, arguing that it is a 
misplacement of order. More to the point, Aristotelian presentation of virtue 
as implicated in the ‘golden mean’ poses kind of difficulty in identifying the 
extremes. His understanding that virtues are acquired through constant efforts 
and not given or by mere chances disputes his explication that the inclination 
30 Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 13.
31 Edward Uzoma Ezedike, “Happiness as an End: A Critique of Aristotle’s Rational 
Eudaimonism,” Inkanyiso: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 10, no. 1 (2018): 51-62. 
32 Ibid., 59. 
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through the course of happiness which automatically involves virtuous life is 
natural to man. Just as Spinoza, Aristotle opines that there is a natural tendency 
of all things to persist and continue to maintain their own characteristics. That 
is, there is a natural force in every animate being including man towards self-
preservation of its very existence. But very little was observed in his writings 
that addressed the force to avert the things that threaten to harm or take away 
existence. Among other weaknesses of his treatise that concerned man’s striving 
to persist, Aristotle contradicted himself by explaining that happiness which 
involves man’s inclination to persist in life is innate and naturally given to him, that 
is, it naturally unfolds itself. However, at the same time, he holds that happiness 
requires excellent virtuous activity that involves desires, appropriation of feelings 
and activities, right judgment and right choices that can only be acquired by 
constant exercise of moral goodness towards excellence other than by chance. 
Aristotle establishes that man has the natural inclination to continue to develop 
and actualize his potentials. However, he made us to understand that this natural 
striving ceases at the very end of the developmental process which he actually 
referred to as the entelechy. In his understanding, the term entelechy denotes full 
realization of man’s potentialities that ends the process of his existence. Such 
cessation possesses no characteristics as to how and when it occurs. Could his 
notion of entelechy, which means an end of developmental process, concede to 
natural forces opposed to existence?
In addition, the great necessity laid on virtues (action based on proper use of 
reason) for the realization of happiness invariably suggests that the non-virtuous 
will not experience happiness. Further still, Aristotelian notion of happiness, which 
culminates in intellectual contemplation, seems to contradict his explication of 
man as a being with tripartite dimensions of vegetative, sensitive and rational 
soul. Now, the emphasis on happiness as the result of man’s activity that 
terminates in pure intellectual exercise negates the other aspects of man that 
share in nutritive and sensual functions. Again, Aristotle purported that emotions 
are accompanied by pleasures and pains but his explications were not too clear 
on their complex functions with regard to man’s inner drive to persist. Finally, the 
inclination to desire poses an epistemological question. Thus, how can man know 
the right things to desire and the right actions to perform33 that lead to virtues 
since virtuous acts lack principle guidelines of universal character? 
VII. Recommendations for Further Studies
This paper recommends that studies on Aristotelian happiness especially as it 
concerns conatus (the will to persist) should be given more attention. Again, 
it advocates that his concepts and their expositions on matters regarding the 
33 John L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin Books, 1977), 186.
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inner drive to maintain existence and flourish in it should be clarified to minimize 
ambiguities. Besides, obvious contradictions as mentioned above, should be 
reconciled. This paper further proposes that individuals should engage in things 
that bring them real and lasting happiness in this physical world so to sustain with 
ease the will to live and blossom in life. Above all, the paper proposes that both 
individual and global peace may be restored through giving meaning to life by 
concentrating on the activities that drive to virtuous activities of the soul and 
true happiness of man whereby the means justifies the end for which nothing else 
may be desired. 
 
VIII. Conclusion
Having critically evaluated Aristotelian concept of happiness and its conative 
role in human existence, this paper demonstrates that Aristotle’s theory 
remains quite influential for subsequent discussions on conatus (the will to 
persist) despite all the critiques raised. From the above, it becomes clear that 
happiness, as conceived by Aristotle as the ultimate end of all human activity, 
is a very crucial factor that sets man in motion and upholds his innate drive 
to maintain his existence. The features that characterize man’s happiness 
and determine his persistence in life are implicated in his soul as the capacity 
to desire rightly, choose rightly and act appropriately towards excellence. 
Emotions as pain and pleasure map man’s value of life. They regulate his life. 
As pleasure or pain, they can determine moral progress since good conduct 
consists of proper attitude towards desires. Poor perception of emotions may 
lead to conditions that do not encourage the will to live. Poor perception of 
emotions may lead to conditions that do not encourage the will to live, while 
good judgement of emotions may encourage rightful responses that promote 
and enhance life. However, to sustain man’s inner drive to persist in life, this 
paper objects to the theses that happiness can only be teleological and that 
the restriction of virtuous acts, which leads to happiness, culminates only 
in cognitive activities. Hence, other dimensions of human nature and those 
individuals that are mentally incapacitated should be put into considerations.
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